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Abstract
In contrast to the Cleary-McNemar view affirmed by Cole in the
October 1981 issue of the American Psychologist on testing
—
"questions of bias are fundamentally questions of vaiidity"--
this report shows that freedom from statutory test bias, as
interpreted by the courts, is different from predictive validity.
Use of a score-adjustment formula developed here to correct for
statutory test bias shows in typical cases not only that the
correction tends only negligibly to reduce predictive validity
but also that the enhancement of predictive validity without
regard to statutory test bias can add a sizable criterion-inde-
pendent decrement selectively to the already low test scores of
low-scoring demographic groups.
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Racial 3ias and Predictive Validity
in Testing for Selection
Widely perceived as gatekeepers of opportunity, tests have
been a popular target of attack in the fight against racial dis-
crimination (e.g., Notes 1 and 2). Mounting challenges have
shaken test experts from the complacent position that tests are
color-blind measuring instruments no more to blame for abnormally
lov; scores than thermometers are for abnormally high temperatures
(Marston, 1971; Weitzman, 1972). Pioneered principally by Guion
(1966) and Cleary (1968) , recent analyses have revealed occur-
rences of putative discrimination in which tests often play a
leading if unwitting and innocent role. Definitions of fairness
in test use have not been uniform, a circumstance to which
Flaugher (1978) has drawn particular attention, and treatments
intended to assure one form of fairness would seem to work
against another. Overcoming discrimination in test use, however,
depends on the reconciliation of these differences.
Development of expertise in a technical field like psycho-
logical testing tends to produce increasing expectation and
tolerance of complication. Whereas the public at large might
condemn as biased a test on which white and black people have
different means, a test expert is likely to consider this judg-
ment to be premature. In the expert's view, more may be involved
than simply a difference in test means. Particularly if the use
of the test is to select applicants for work or school, the
final verdict on test bias must also take into account subsequent
performance on the job or in the classroom. If the racial group
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having the higher test mean tends to perform correspondingly better
at work or school, then the difference in means may be a more
accurate reflection of test validity than of test bias.
Different from most definitions of test bias reported in the
literature on the use of tests in selection, the definition adopted
in this report contrasts test bias with attenuation of both
predictive validity and fairness in test use. Whereas a valid
test tends neither to under- nor to overestimate the ability of
any racial group, a biased test , as defined here, tends to distinguish
between racial groups of equal ability. Because in selection the
purpose of a test is prediction rather than measurement, "ability"
in this definition refers not to a latent trait, like intelligence,
but to the manifest criterion performance to be predicted. Defined
in relation to validity, test bias is, like validity, a technical
property of a test different from fairness, which is a property of
test use. Even though a test is free from bias, therefore, a user
of the test may still perceive a need for special selection proce-
dures to assure its fair use. Jensen (1980) makes a corresponding
distinction between freedom from test bias and fairness in test
use, but for him test bias is differential validity, not a tendency
to distinguish between racial groups of equal ability. Most other
definitions of test bias in the literature turn out on consideration
of the distinction between fair and unbiased testing actually to
be definitions of fairness in test use.
Procedures for assuring the fair use of specific tests require
the use of either multiple cutting scores or equivalent score adjust-
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ments. Different definitions of fairness lead to correspondingly
different pairs of cutting scores. The next section presents a
critique of the use of multiple cutting scores. Proponents of one
definition of fairness tend to argue against others. Succeeding
sections consider some of the more critical of these arguments /
particularly in relation to the definiton of test bias adopted here.
The final sections discuss the use of this definiton to approximate
bias-free testing both with and without the use of score adjustments.
Test bias can result in the evaluation of the members of one
group differently from the members of another group solely because
of group membership. The groups may differ with respect to any of a
number of demographic variables such as race and sex. To simplify
the discussion, this report will refer only to the variable race.
Everything said here, however, will apply equally well to other
demographic variables that distinguish groups.
The discussion will frequently involve correlations between
race and predictor or criterion variables. Whether these correlation
are positive or negative depends on the mean scores of the two racial
groups on these variables. In accordance with custom, a correlation
will be positive if the mean score is higher and negative if the mean
score is lower for the traditionally favored group.
Selection, of course, involves both predictor and criterion
variables. The problem of concern here is possible predictor bias.
Criterion bias, also possible and certainly no less important (Flaugh
1978; Green, 1975; Gulliksen, Note 3), is beyond the scope of this
report.
Multiple Cutting Scores
Multiple-cutting-score definitions of fairness in test use
Test Bias and Validity
5
reflect a variety of standards of fairness. According to
Thorndike ' s (1971) definition, appropriately different cutting
scores should yield selection proportions that match success pro-
portions for the different groups. If X per cent of all appli-
cants in Group A would be successful if selected, then the cut-
ting score for Group A should yield the selection of X per cent
of all Group A applicants. Cleary's (1968) definition likewise
implies the use of different cutting scores if Group A and Group
B applicants having the same predictor score have different mean
criterion scores. The different cutting scores in this case
should correspond to the criterion score separating success from
failure.
The Thorndike and Cleary proposals, contrasted at length
by Schmidt and Hunter (1974), are only two among many. Linn
(1973) and Cole (1973) proposed complementary standards of fair-
ness for different racial groups: equal proportions of success-
ful applicants among the selectees (Linn) and equal proportions
of selectees among the successful applicants (Cole) . Resembling
Linn's, a standard proposed by Einhorn and Bass (1971) is that
at their cutting scores members of the different racial groups
have equal probabilities of success or failure (risk) . Two pro-
posals that directly require only a single cutting score
indirectly, through score adjustment, require one for each racial
group. These are proposals by Darlington (19 71) and McNemar
(1975). Darlington, with only a single cutting score, achieves
the effect of multiple cutting scores by adjusting the obtained
criterion scores; McNemar, similarly, uses race as a predictor
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along with the predictor test to form a multiple predictor--the
single multiple-predictor cutting score yields the same selection
as the multiple cutting scores in the Cleary procedure (see Fig-
ure 1). Except for the McNemar and the Cleary procedures, which
both use race to maximize validity, all these different procedures
involve different standards of fairness and yield correspondingly
different cutting scores.
These differences constitute a compelling argument against
the possibility of distributional justice (unconditionally fair
reward). According to Kaufmann (1973), distributional justice is
impossible because of the multiplicity of dimensions of fairness.
A single judgment cannot be fair with respect to all dimensions.
Multiple cutting scores, of course, reflect a concern with
validity and standards of fairness lacking in the simple use of
quotas. As just noted, however, the results of this concern have
been unfortunate. Except for the Cleary and McNemar standard,
which yields multiple cutting scores that generally favor white over
black applicants (Cleary, 1968; Temp, Note 4; Schmidt and Hunter, 197
all standards of fairness are inconsistent with maximal validity, as
all, with no exception, are inconsistent among themselves. The
effective difference between quotas and multiple cutting scores
may thus be no more than that multiple cutting scores are less
predictable than quotas in their impact on selection.
Even proposals to achieve a social consensus regarding the
establishment of multiple cuttings scores (e.g., Darlington,
1971; Gross and Su, 1975; and Petersen and Novick, 1976) must
fail, though not for technical reasons. Social consensus is sub-
ject to test by the courts, and the courts have already cast a





Figure 1. An applicant having the predictor score at the foot
of the vertical dashed line will have the same selection fate
through the use of either the Cleary or the McNemar procedure—
the applicant will be accepted if white (W) , rejected if black (B)
.
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shadow over the use of multiple cutting scores. The United States
Supreme Court in the pivotal Bakke case rejected the implementa-
tion of racial quotas in college-admissions procedures. Succeed-
ing court rulings are likely to move even further in the same
direction, and the distance between quotas and multiple cutting
scores, as just noted, is not great. Subsequent to the Bakke case,
the 3rd District Court of Appeal in California, in fact, ruled
against the use of score adjustments to offset lower minority
2grades or test scores. An admissions officer who adds X points
to the score of a minority applicant or uses for the applicant
a cutting score X points lower than for a non-minority applicant
will, of course, arrive at the same selection result. The Cali-
fornia decision thus extends the Bakke rejection of quotas to
prohibit the use of multiple cutting scores in selection. The
use of any multiplicity of cutting scores, however determined,
is indeed interpretable as the implementation of quotas , for is
it not the intended effect of this use always to increase the
admission proportion of one race relative to another? Even if
the intent were separable from the effect, the use of multiple
cutting scores would still replace arguable discrimination by
unarguable reverse discrimination: the admission of black
applicants who score lower than unadmitted white applicants.
Test experts can argue that discrimination in one form or the
other might occur without the use of multiple cutting scores,
Regents of the University of California vs. Bakke, 98 S.Ct.
2733 (1978).
2DeRonde vs. Regents of the University of California, 101 Cal
App. 34rd 191 (1980) .
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but this argument is likely to leave many non-experts uncon-
vinced. Multiple cutting scores would thus appear to constitute
a double standard ultimately justifiable only by the claim that
the utility of a college education differs for different racial
groups. People who are able to agree that a college education
has greater utility for one racial group than for another ought
also to be able to agree that the ownership of a new automobile
has the same relative utilities for the two racial groups. The
first agreement entails appropriately different cutting scores
for admission to college, however, only if the second entails
correspondingly different prices of new automobiles. Social con-
sensus cannot establish multiple cutting scores because— if for
no other reason— it points to the use of single ones.
No imposed balance of the future against the past can be
just. The past cannot be undone
—
people who suffered in the
past suffered no less even if their descendants fare better.
A person does not remove the bias from a coin that has turned
up five successive heads by assuring that the next five tosses
will produce tails. If each toss is bias-free, however, the
proportion of heads will tend to equal the proportion of tails
in the long-run. The proposal here is thus not to attempt to
balance bias against counter-bias—discrimination against reverse
discrimination—but rather to make each test use as nearly bias-
free as possible.
The Measurement of Test Bias
A proper definition of test bias ought to imply actions
that do not reduce discrimination at the exoense of reverse
Test Bias and Validity
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discrimination. Rather than providing guidance only for the
determination of multiple cutting scores or score adjustments,
such a definition ought also to constitute the basis for measur-
ing test bias. Armed with a measure of test bias, a test user
can identify the test having the least bias among tests that are
equally desirable in other respects.
Test bias, as defined here, occurs when, and only when,
race (R) accounts for variation on the predictor (P) that has
no counterpart on the criterion (C) . The occurrence of test bias
thus depends on the correlation between race and the component of
the predictor uncorrelated with the criterion. This is the part
correlation
r - r _rRP L PC X RC
*<P*C) / i . r 2PC
Since this correlation is zero when, and only when, the component
of P uncorrelated with C is also uncorrelated with R, the inequa-
lity
rR(P-C) * ° (2)
must define test bias.
This definition of test bias conforms to the requirements
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court in 1971: Either (a) the use of tests in
selection must have a numerically equal impact on minority and
non-minority applicant groups or (b) any numerical advantage of
one group over another must empirically reflect a corresponding
3 ...lob-related advantage. The second of these conditions fails
Griggs vs. Duke Power Co., 91 S.Ct. 849 (1971).
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technically whenever a nonzero correlation exists between race
and the component of the predictor that is not correlated with
the criterion (job), that is, whenever r , _. * 0.
Not only does a non-zero value of ro/ p n\ define test bias,
but also any value of r_ ,_ _> constitutes a measure of test
bias. Values of r_ ,_. „. far from zero represent greater abso-K (P »c
;
lute bias than values close to zero. Positive values of r . .
R ( P • C )
represent bias, negative values counterbias. A test for which
rR(P-C) = ° is bias
" free -
The definition rp , r > * corresponds closely to a defini-
tion proposed by Darlington (1971)
:
rRP-C * ° • (3)
Stating that at every value of the criterion the mean predictor
score tends to be larger for one race than for the other, this
definition seems to capture the essence of test bias— a uniform
tendency to score one race above the other where no criterion
difference exists. The partial correlation in this definition
is proportional to the part correlation rp(p.c)' w -'- th
K = (1 - r-^, ) 2 as the constant of proportionality:RC
rRP-C " KrR(P.C)
<4 '
Since K does not depend on the predictor, the inequality
r * constitutes a definition of test bias equivalent toRP«C
r , * 0. Citing the definition rRp . c ^ as the third
of
four possibilities, Darlington contrasted it with the first, also
involving a partial correlation:
r * , (5)RC'P
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which is, in fact, a formulaic version of the Cleary (1968) defin-
nition, whose use to determine multiple cutting scores was noted
earlier. The differences between these two partial-correlation
definitions support the adoption of rRp . c J
6 (or, equivalently
,
r , p . r - J
1 0) as the proper definition of test bias. The next
section examines these differences.
Partial-correlation Definitions
One argument against the use of multiple cutting scores
other than Cleary 's is that their use attenuates validity (Dar-
lington, 1976). Cleary's exception makes comparison of r _ ^
with rR _ 7^ especially important. To facilitate discussion,
r p t* will be called the Cleary definition and rRp>r f
the Darlington 3 definition of test bias. Both involve partial
correlations in identical relationships. Their formal resem-
blance, however, belies fundamental differences. As Hunter and
Schmidt (1976) have pointed out, the two definitions are incon-
sistent. Since r is proportional to r - r _rRr and
r_
c . p
is proportional to r _ - r rRp , both cannot be equal to
zero at the same time unless r = 1
,
which is unlikely to the
point of impossibility (no test has perfect validity) . This
inconsistency has implications for both the definition and the
measurement of test bias: If r f defines test bias,RP * C^
r__ 7^ cannot; if r _ measures test bias, r _ must
measure something else.
A scatterplot showing the relationship between standardized
predictor and criterion measurements ( rpp > ^ provides a geo-
metric representation of this inconsistency (see Figure 2) . If
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Figure 2. Separation of racial (R) groups, A and B, with respect
to two regression lines describing the relationship between
standardized predictor (P) and criterion (C) variables when
< r < 1 . The separation is parallel to the P-on-C line forPC
a bias-free test (r_ D = 0) , to the C-on-P line for a test thatKir • L-
satisfies the Cleary condition (rRC>p = 0) .
Test Bias and Validity
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r„ < 1, the regression lines for P on C and C on P cross at
the origin. In the upper-right quadrant (shown) , the P-on-C line
is above the C-on-P line. In the case of no racial differences,
the population means of Groups A and B are equal on each variable.
To satisfy the r
r
= (Darlington 3) condition for a bias-
free test, racial differences must correspond to the separation
of Group A and Group B points parallel to the P-on-C line. The
population means for the two groups will now differ on each vari-
able, but not on P for each sub-population having the same
value of C. Satisfaction of the r =0 (Cleary) condition
for a bias-free test corresponds to the separation of Group A
and Group B points parallel to the C-on-P line. Since when
r
c
< 1 this line is not parallel to the P-on-C line, satisfac-
tion of the two conditions cannot occur simultaneously unless
rPC
= l '
The inconsistency just demonstrated means that any procedure
that moves one of the two partial correlations toward zero must
simultaneously move the other one away from zero to the extent
2
that rpr differs from one. Procedures that move the Cleary
partial correlation toward zero enhance validity (Darlington,
1976). Validity must thus, to some extent, be a casualty of the
adoption of Darlington 3 over Cleary.
Technical grounds for deciding in favor of Darlington 3
over Cleary do exist, however. In contrasting the r„
c> p f
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and the ^op.p ¥ ° definitions of test bias, Darlington (1971)
showed that the race-predictor correlation (r_,_) is considerably
Kir
greater when rRC . p - than when r_„ c - 0, particularly for
low test validities. This difference in r-.- values is due to
Kir
the correlation between race and the component of the predictor
uncorrelated with the criterion ( rrwp.f<})' which satisfaction of
the Cleary equality (r__ p = 0) tends to inflate along with rRP . C '
Attempts to satisfy the Cleary equality thus work to increase the
race-predictor correlation inordinately in the process of
extracting the entire potential contribution of race to validity.
Indeed, if the validity achieved in this process is equal to the
race-criterion correlation, whatever its value, then, because
r-^, must be equal to rr._r__ to satisfy the Cleary equality, theKL. r L. Kir
race-predictor correlation will swell to one! The Cleary
procedure and its McNemar equivalent have no safeguard to
prevent the predictor from becoming race itself ("white, you're
in; black, you're out").
The technical decision between the r_._, _ and r_._. _, defi-
KL. • Jr Kir * L.
nitions of test bias is reducible to a more publically accessible
decision. Only when r.,-, n is equal to zero does race affectKL. • ir
the criterion through the predictor alone. This is certainly an
advantage of rori „. What is wrong, however, if race has anKL. • ir
effect on the criterion other than through the predictor? Some
Test Bias and Validity
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(but not all) validity due to race may be lost, but a zero value
of r permits a perhaps greater danger: Race may have an
effect— a possibly large effect—on the predictor other than
through the criterion. This effect is bias, which only a zero
value of rRp _ can eliminate. The decision between r r and
r Rp _ thus reduces to the decision between maximizing validity
and minimizing bias.
Strong support thus exists for the adoption of the Darling-
ton 3 in preference to the Cleary definition of test bias. Read-
ers familiar with published critiques that appear to challenge
the Darlington 3 definition may not yet feel comfortable with
this preference, however. The need now, then, is to consider
these critiques.
The Hunter-Schmidt Critique
In reference to a predictor correlated with only one factor of
a two- factor criterion, Hunter and Schmidt C1976) assumed this
factor to be related to race and considered the two cases in which
the other factor either was or was not also related to race. The
first case becomes a problem for Darlington 3, according to Hunter
and Schmidt, if in selection for college the two factors are un-
correlated and the predictor is a pure measure of academic ability.
In this case, which fails to satisfy the Cleary equality, Hunter
and Schmidt observed that simply a failure also to satisfy the
Darlington 3 equality could attach to a perfect predictor the
opprobrium of bias. Failure to satisfy the Cleary equality alone,
however, could not only attach to this predictor the same opprobriu
Test Bias and Validity
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but also the opprobrium of attenuated predictive validity. Since
the purpose of a predictor is to predict rather than to measure, in
fact, a predictor cannot be perfect for its purpose if the criterion
predicted is an impure measure of what the predictor is a pure mea-
sure. The validity that counts in selection is predictive, not
construct, validity. Though pure, therefore, the predictor in this
case is not perfect. In the second case, which satisfies the
Cleary but not the Darlington 3 equality, Hunter and Schmidt argued
that the choice of a predictor correlated with only the first (racial)
factor may reflect merely ignorance of the second, not intentional
bias. Effect, rather than intention, is the critical concern, how-
ever, and solely the attempt to maximize predictive validity without
any intention to create bias may produce this case. Apart from these
two cases, Hunter and Schmidt wondered how a criterion, as the con-
trol variable in Darlington 3, could cause race to covary with a
predictor that necessarily preceded it in time. The use of Darling-
ton 3 to indicate test bias makes no reference to causation, however.
Any predictor, whatever it measures or fails to measure and whatever
the intention that it do so, thus does indeed deserve the opprobrium
of bias if, as indicated by Darlington 3, variation on it contains
a component due to race that is absent from variation on the cri-
terion.
The Petersen-Novick Critique
In a nice argument against the possibility of distributional
justice, Petersen and Novick (1976) rejected the standards of
fairness proposed by Thorndike (1971) , Linn (1973) , and Cole

Test Bias and Validity
15(a)
(1973) for determining multiple cutting scores. (In the case of
Thorndike, the argument actually applies to an extended version
requiring equal ratios—not necessarily 1:1—of selection to
success proportions for the different groups.) Each of these
standards has an equally justifiable converse. No more or less
justifiable than the "extended Thorndike" requirement that the
proportion selected be the same fraction of the proportion suc-
cessful for every group, for example, is the converse require-
ment involving the proportion rejected and the proportion
Test Bias and Validity
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unsuccessful. The cutting scores determined by the application
of a standard and its converse are generally different, however.
The Thorndike, Linn, and Cole standards of fairness are thus
internally inconsistent.
A casual review of the literature suggests that the
Petersen-Novick argument might also apply to the Darlington 3
definition of test bias. Since a test for which rRp> _, = may
not require the use of multiple cutting scores to meet Cole's
standard of fairness, Cole (1973) associated her definition of
"test bias" with Darlington's r__. „ f . Both Hunter and
Kir " \~
Schmidt (1976) and Petersen and Novick (1976) acknowledged this
association without examining it further. Further examination,
however, shows -chat the Darlington 3 definition lies outside the
purview of the Petersen-Novick argument. Only in the case of a
binary criterion that dichotomizes the population into a subpopu-
lation of successes and a subpopulation of failures may the
Darlington 3 condition r__. n = generally obviate the need for
multiple cutting scores to meet Cole's standard of fairness, and
the Petersen-Novick argument does not extend to this case. Under
the conditions of predictor normality and homoscedasticity for
the two racial groups within each criterion-defined subpopulation,
in fact, the equality of predictor means implied by the Darlington 3
condition r„_ „ = in turn implies the simultaneous satisfaction
rp • c
of both the Cole standard of fairness and its converse.
Test Bias and Validity
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The Darlington Critiques
Although Darlington (1971) proposed the equality rRP . r = °
as a possible definition of "culture fairness," he did not him-
self endorse this proposal. In the same 1971 article and again
later (Darlington, 1976), he criticized all definitions involv-
ing formulas as too mechanical. Darlington's own preference
was for judgmental methods that reflect the relative importance
of criterion performance and reverse discrimination. The prin-
ciple underlying this preference is that some nonzero amount of
reverse discrimination is desirable. The arguments made earlier
regarding social consensus apply here. No principle favoring
reverse discrimination is likely to prevail in a democratic
society against the principle that the only desirable discrimi-
nation is zero discrimination.
Darlington (1976) extended his criticism of formulaic defi-
nitions of "culture fairness" to include possible conflict with
validity, mixture of technical (psychometric) and political
arguments, insufficient and low-quality selection of minorities
from applicant pools having poor minority representation, and
the possible arbitrariness of unfavored-group identification.
All but the first of these criticisms apply potentially to any
procedure designed to remedy test bias or discrimination in test
use. As long as both validity and fair test use are desirable,
for example, no procedure can be free of either technical or
political arguments. The first criticism, moreover, simply
reflects reality: Validity and fair test use are, by most stan-
dards of fairness, conflicting objectives. Validity will,
Test Bias and Validity
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indeed, be a casualty of all procedures, including those
endorsed by Darlington, that yield selection results different
from the results yielded by the Cleary or McNemar procedures.
The apparent validity loss in one example cited by Darlington
is serious enough to require special comment, however. In this
example, based on empirical data, a white applicant whose pre-
dicted criterion percentile is 50 would have the same selection
fate as a black applicant whose corresponding percentile is only
1. Darlington indicated neither how he used Darlington 3 to
obtain this result nor what the percentile difference might be
before its use. Percentile differences, in any case, are not
validity coefficients. A proper evaluation of validity loss due
to the use of any procedure would have not only to compare valid-
ity coefficients determined both before and after the use of the
procedure but also to include corresponding results of rival pro-
cedures in the comparison. One commendable procedure, particu-
larly, is to use neither multiple cutting scores nor differential
score adjustment but the most valid available bias-free test.
Regardless of the procedure used, however, test users must be
prepared to sacrifice incremental validity bought at the expense
of test bias or discrimination.
Correction for Test Bias
Test bias as defined by Cleary (1968) is correctable by the
use of either the test (predictor) alone with multiple cutting
scores (Cleary, 1968) or the test-race multiple predictor with
a single cutting score (McNemar, 1975) . The first of these
options cannot work directly to make r__
r
equal zero because
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two predictor scores, while possibly corresponding by regression
to the same criterion score (Cleary's procedure), cannot corre-
spond by regression to the same predictor score. A form of score
adjustment, like the second (McNemar) option, can work to make
rRP*C e<3ual zero, however. The adjustment
P* = Z
p + 3Z R , (6)
where Z is the standardized predictor and Z the standardized
racial measurement and
r - r r
R - _
RP RC PC
P - 5 , (7)
1 - rRC
will, in fact, make r * equal zero (see Appendix A for com-
plete derivation). Though analogous to McNemar ' s multiple pre-
dictor,
~P P D R R ' '"'
this adjustment has the effect of minimizing test bias rather
than maximizing test validity.
The next section illustrates the effect of the adjustment P*
on test validity.
Trade-off between Test Bias and Validity
A trade-off exists between test bias and validity so that
the elimination of bias creates a reduction in validity. An
example will illustrate this trade-off. Table 1 (left column)
describes a test having a validity (rpr ) of .41 maximized by race
with a race-predictor correlation (r__) of .40, corresponding to
a separation of 1.25 standard-deviation units (S ) between black
(P_) and nonblack (P ) means on the predictor:
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Table 1
Trade-off between Bias and Validity when r^ „ =1 RC* P
Test data Adjustment results Adjustment
(rROP = 0) (rRP*C = 0)
rRC





= .41 rp ^ c
=





.06 SZg = +0.95
Note. Z_ (-2.775) is the standardized black and Z T7 (+0.35)
the standardized nonblack racial measurement.
< PW









where p = .112 (proportion of black people in the population).
The remaining entries in Table 1 are determinable from these
values of rpc and rRp . Since rRC . p = and rRp *. c
=
,












r + 8rPC P RC





(see Appendix B for complete derivation). The test is biased:
r.,,-, _,< = .37. The entries in the leftmost two columns of TableR(P*C)
1 to be compared are the validities r„^ and r-*- and thePL P X C
race-predictor correlations r _ and r . . The differencesRP RP
between r__ and r-,-.* and between r„^ and r_ + _ inRP RP X PC P^L
Table 1 indicate that elimination of test bias results in a
large reduction in the race-predictor correlation but only a
2
small reduction in validity. Whereas r is .16 (r = .40)
K.P i\P
with a maximal validity of .41 for the unadjusted predictor (left
column) , adjustment of the predictor to eliminate bias reduces
the square of the race-predictor correlation virtually to
zero (r-,-.* = .06) while reducing the maximal validity by onlyRP
.02 to .39 (middle column). The trade-off thus involves a much
2greater change in bias, reflected in the relative rRp and
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r ^. values, than validity
-
RP* 1
The amount of adjustment from P to P , however, was not
small: an increase by almost one standard-deviation unit of each
black score coupled with a modest decrease of each white score
(right column of Table 1). The direction, no less than the amount
of adjustment, is notable. Different from the McNemar (Cleary)
adjustment, which would generally favor white applicants- this
adjustment favors black applicants. The amount and direction of
adjustment together reflect substantial bias in the unadjusted
predictor against black applicants.
This bias is disturbing because the example cited may not be
atypical. Predictors are common on which white means exceed
black means by more or less 1.25 standard-deviation units to
produce r values of around .40 (see Table 2, based on data
reported by Temp, Note 4). The median validity of the Scholastic
Aptitude Test is .41 (Note 5, p. 16). Corresponding through
Equation (9) to the white-black mean difference of .5
standard-deviation units typical of a performance measure (Hunter,
Schmidt, and Rauschenberger , 1977, p. 249), the race-criterion
correlation of .16 is the correlation with race that a criterion
would have if .41 were the validity maximized by race with an rRp
value of .40. Use of race to maximize validity can thus, by its
effect on the race-predictor correlation, often produce
considerable test bias.
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Table 2
White-minus-black SAT Mean Differences in Standard-deviation Units
School
Verbal Quantitative












4 1.46 72 1.56 89
5 1.26 109 , 1.37 108
6 1.34 73 1.10 91
7 1.56 101 1.50 107
8 1.09 94 1.16 85
9 1.43 96 1.27 99
10 1.61 90 1.91 80
11 0.80 89 0.96 85
12 0.83 80 0.77 75
13 0.66 91 1.19 91
Note . Temp (Note 4, p. 10) reported means and standard deviations
for the two racial groups separately. Use of the formulas
P = pPn + (l-p)Pw and S p
2




-, 2(1-p) (PT7 - P) , with p = .112, provided the total- groupw
information needed to compute the entries in this table
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The use of race to enhance validity need not be overt or even
intentional. Nor does this example mean that the SAT is racially
biased— the combination of typical values of r„„. r . and r „ mayltr PC RP RC 2
be quite rare, and all these values may be quite different in
populations of randomly accepted applicants. Because in r
conditioning is on the criterion, use of values of r and r* PC RC
corrected for attenuation due to criterion unreliability may also
be more appropriate than use of the observed values.
Investigation of the possibility of bias for the SAT and other
standardized tests is important, however. What is particularly
disturbing is that inadvertently in the process of test
construction race may have frequently in the past contributed
substantially to test bias while contributing only modestly to
validity.
Recapitulation
Pursuing the distinction between test bias and invalidity
examined earlier, the previous two sections presented a correction
for test bias and used this correction to examine the effects of
both bias reduction on validity and validity enhancement on bias.
The use of race to enhance validity can produce a race-predictor
correlation that is not only much higher than the race-criterion
correlation but also more or less as high as the predictor-criterion
correlation (see Table 1). These relationships reflect test bias:
a nonzero correlation between race and the component of the predic-
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tor uncorrelated with the criterion. Elimination of bias reduces
the race-predictor correlation substantially while reducing validity
only slightly. Corresponding to the positive race-criterion correla-
tion, a positive race-predictor correlation still exists after the
elimination of bias. This correlation, however, separates values
indicative of bias above it from values indicative of counter-bias
below.
Test Choice versus Score Adjustment
If attempts to maximize validity tend to produce test bias,
what objective other than maximal validity should a test developer
or test user pursue? Who of these two, moreover, should be the
more responsible for the pursuit of this objective? These ques-
tions arise from the distinction between bias and invalidity,
and the first question particularly constitutes a problem that
does not exist in the Cleary-McNemar view of test bias. Just as
attempts to increase validity tend also to increase reliability,
so in the Cleary-McNemar view do these attempts tend to decrease
test bias. The problem created by distinguishing between test
bias and invalidity is a problem of multiple objectives.
Resolution of this problem is possible by recasting it so
that one objective becomes a constraint while the other remains
as the sole objective. In the trade-off between the two objec-
tives, a large change in bias corresponds to a small change in
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validity. This imbalance suggests that zero bias should be the con
straint. A constraint requires fixation at a specific value,
moreover, and no such value for validity (other than one, which
is all but impossible) corresponds to the value of zero bias.
Test developers or test users should thus attempt to maximize
validity under the constraint of zero bias.
Since a correction for bias exists, this constrained maxi-
mization is easier for the test user than the test developer.
The test user need only adjust the predictor by use of equations
(6) and (7), Though easier, however, this may not be the gener-
ally better solution to the problem. The adjustment will typi-
cally favor black applicants by a substantial amount (see Table
1). Argument that the unadjusted scores favor white applicants
by the same amount is not likely to preclude charges of re-
verse discrimination. The better solution politically,
though not practically, may thus be for the test developer to
attempt to make zero-biased tests with validities as high as
possible. The test user would then have the politically accept-
able role of choosing among two or more tests the one having
maximal validity and minimal bias.
Toward Bias-free Selection
Ruling out the use of multiple cutting scores or differen-
tial score adjustment, a test user may thus be left with the
option of trying to choose among tests that differ by varying
amounts in bias and validity. The choice between two tests is
not difficult if both r„_ is closer to one and r_. ,_ _. isPC R(P'C)
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closer to zero for one than for the other. Difficulty arises
when for one test r and for the other r , , has the more
PL- R (P *L)
favorable value. In this case, the choice depends on how the
difference between the two r values compares with the differ-
ence between the two r , . values. If one difference is sub-
stantially larger than the other, then the test user can base
his choice solely on the larger difference. Otherwise, consider-
ations additional to bias and validity must determine the choice.
The availability of more than two tests to choose from will
generally facilitate the choice. Whether easy or difficult,
however, choosing a test with minimal bias may be only a trivial
step toward bias-free selection if even the minimal bias is far
from zero. The real challenge is thus- not test choice but test
development.
The basic units of a test are, of course, its items. A test
ought to be bias-free, therefore, to the extent that its items
are bias-free. Bias-free items are not, of course, items whose
difficulties are equal for the two racial groups. A test com-
posed entirely of such items would have an r value of zero,
lower than r values typical of bias-free tests (see Tables
£\P
1 and 3) and thus indicative of counterbias. Freedom from bias
must take the criterion into account. Using a definition of
item bias like Darlington 3, therefore, Scheuneman (1979) devel-
oped a method of item analysis to produce bias-free tests.
According to Darlington 3, a test is bias-free if in each sub-
population of individuals having the same criterion score the
mean predictor scores are equal for the two racial groups;
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according to Scheuneman's definition, an item is bias-free if
in each subpopulation of individuals having the same test score
the item difficulties are equal for the two racial groups.
Although the Darlington 3 definition extends naturally from tests
to items, the Cleary definition does not. Extended to items,
the Cleary definition makes no sense: An item would be bias-
free if in each subpopulation of individuals having the same item
score (correct or incorrect) the mean test scores were equal for
the two racial groups! Actually, the Scheuneman counterpart of
Darlington 3 involves complications because each item contributes
not only to the total test bias but also to the total test score.
The removal or addition of items to reduce test bias may thus
alter the Scheuneman bias of the remaining items. Better than
partialing out the total test score from the item-race correla-
tion would be partialing out the criterion from this correlation.
Criterion availability ought to be no problem for tests used in
selection, and for the development of these tests Scheuneman's
work provides a useful guide.
Concluding Remarks
Defining test bias consistently with the 1971 United States
Supreme Court ruling regarding discrimination in selection, that
individual differences having no effect on criterion performance
should also have no effect on predictor performance, this report
has demonstrated that considerable test bias, so defined, may result
from attempts to maximize predictive validity to values attenuated
only slightly by score adjustments that eliminate the bias. In a
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previous use of score adjustments, Hunter, Schmidt, and Rauschen-
berger (1977) compared the trade-off effects of satisfying Cleary
and other standards of fair test use, including Darlington 3, on
black selection ratios and mean criterion performance of all accep-
ted applicants: The ratios tended generally to be much higher and
the performance only somewhat lower for Darlington 3 than for
Cleary over the 0-1 range of post-adjustment total-group validities.
Invalidating their results in numerical detail, though not overall
contour, Hunter et al. mistakenly considered these validities to be
equal within-group predictor-criterion correlations (pp. 249, 257),
unaffected by score adjustments. Taking (CT7 - C^) generally to
be .5 and finding the corresponding (PT7 * - P D *) to satisfy each
condition of fair test use, they further considered the difference
between this and its observed counterpart (P - P_) to be the
score adjustment for the condition. Since r RP * and rRC are
point-biserial correlations (see Equation (9)), particularly, the
Darlington 3 condition r^* = rp * crRC implies for standardized




*) = r * (C^ - Cg) . This is exactly the
form of the corresponding Hunter et al. equation (p. 257) , presen-
ted by them without derivation; differing only is the interpreta-
tion of the correlation, seen here clearly to be the post-adjustment
total-group validity (rp *c ) . As different functions of post-
adjustment total-group validities, the score adjustments used by
Hunter et al. in the comparisons involving Darlington 3 and Cleary
are not determinable from available data, and indeed their use to
compare the different methods failed to show for each method the
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total-group validity changes from unknown though differing
pre-adjustment values to predetermined common post-adjustment
values. In any event, the comparisons reported by Hunter et al.,
despite their numerical errors, generally support the position
taken here that little, if any, justification exists for predictors
of criterion performance, regardless of their validity, to distin-
guish among groups of individuals who would tend to perform equally
well on the criterion if given the chance.
This position unequivocally refutes the assertion by Cole
(1981) that "questions of bias are fundamentally questions of
validity." Appearing in a special issue of the American Psychologist
on testing, Cole's assertion is an authoritative affirmation of the
Cleary-McNemar position on test bias. Predictive validity is a
compelling concept. Selection error sits opposite predictive vali-
dity on a seesaw; as one goes down, the other goes up. The tempta-
tion is thus strong to extend the concept of predictive validity,
as Cole did, to include other desirable test attributes, as well.
Understanding this temptation may perhaps provide some fortification
to resist it.
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Appendix A
This appendix derives an adjustment to the predictor score
to make r _,, the partial correlation between race (R) and
the predictor (P) controlling for the criterion (C) , equal to zero.
Constituting only a single condition, the equality
rD-n*
= ° can determine only a single constant, 3, in the mul-
tiple predictor P* = Z + 3Z , where the Z's denote standard-
ized measurements for tne subscript variables. Since the numera-
tor of r
Rp *. c is rRp *
- r
RCrp *c , the strategy followed is to






= rRC (VN)SZc (Z p + 8ZR ) (Al)





rRCrPC " rRC [ '
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Appendix B
This appendix develops a formula for the validity of P*
,
rP*C *
The strategy used is direct simplification and substitution
(see Appendix A for notation)
:
1




( S )z S * (B1)
r + 8rPC RC
' V
where S * is the standard deviation of P*
,P
(B2)
S * = /(l/N)Z(Z n + 8Z_) 2 (B3
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